

# **CMBS** Report

Winter 2014




### The CMBS Market



- As of November 2013, outstanding CMBS loans totaled \$738 billion (down from \$744 in October)
- Exposure by property type is heavily weighted towards office collateral at 37%, retail at 25%, and multi-family at 13%.
- Seriously delinquent loans (60+ days delinquent, in foreclosure, REO, or non-performing balloons) dropped 39 basis points this month, to 7.30%.
- November marks the sixth consecutive month of default rate improvement, as it decreased 32 basis points to 7.66%.
- There are currently \$41.3 billion in delinquent loans.
- Deals issued from 2005 through 2007 now represent 77% of total delinquency (in line with the prior month), and delinquent unpaid balance from such represents 4.5% of all CMBS
- Through November 2013, California, Florida and New York account for 30.5% of delinquency.
- CMBS delinquency continues to decline to cycle lows.




## Scorecard-CMBS Swaps






## **Market Overview**

#### **WORLDWIDE CMBS**



#### **US CMBS**

#### MONTHLY ISSUANCE (\$Bil.)



#### CMBS INDEX

As of 12/18		Tota	Total Return (%)			
	Avg. Life	Month to Date	Year to Date	Since 1/1/97		
Invgrade	3.8	0.0	0.5	194.9		
AAA	4.0	-0.1	-0.2	179.8		
AA	3.4	0.0	0.6	82.3		
A	3.5	0.1	1.2	67.3		
BBB	3.6	0.1	3.7	74.2		
	•		Source	r Rambass		



## **Market Overview**



#### **LOAN SPREADS**


#### ASKING SPREADS OVER TREASURYS

10-year loans with 50-59% LTV

12/13	Month Earlier
162	177
160	175
157	166
159	169
	162 160 157


Source: Trepp

#### ASKING OFFICE SPREADS




#### **REIT BOND ISSUANCE**

#### UNSECURED NOTES, MTNs, (\$Bil.)



#### MONTHLY ISSUANCE (\$Bil.)






## Special Servicer Exposure



Special Servicing Exposure by Unpaid Balance (\$BB): January 2005 through October 2013






## Special Servicer Exposure



#### Special Servicing Exposure as a % of Outstanding CMBS: January 2005 through October 2013






## Historical Delinquency



#### **Historical CMBS Delinquency by Unpaid Balance**








## Historical Delinquency




## Historical CMBS Delinquency as a Percentage of Outstanding CMBS Unpaid Balance






# **Delinquency Categories**







# Delinquency by Property Type



Monthly Delinquency By Property Type								
<b>Property Type</b>	Current Balance	<b>Loan Count</b>	% of CMBS Universe	% of CMBS Delinquency	% of Property Type			
Healthcare	\$ 197,139,123	9	0.027%	0.457%	9.26%			
Hotel	\$ 4,644,462,857	202	0.629%	10.755%	7.02%			
Industrial	\$ 2,768,613,029	184	0.375%	6.411%	11.20%			
Multi-family	\$ 7,493,623,608	414	1.015%	17.353%	3.29%			
Office	\$ 14,604,089,125	731	1.979%	33.818%	8.90%			
retail	\$ 10,903,598,472	885	1.478%	25.249%	6.10%			
Other	\$ 2,573,027,414	174	0.349%	5.958%	4.39%			
Total	\$ 43,184,553,628	2,599	5.852%	100.00%				




# Delinquency by Year of Issuance



	Delinquency By Year of Issuance								
Year	Total Year	<b>Loan Count</b>	% of CMBS Universe	% of CMBS Delinquency	% of Year Balance				
2006	\$ 14,288,504,241	702	1.936%	33.087%	10.384%				
2007	\$ 13,818,936,248	766	1.873%	32.000%	9.025%				
2005	\$ 5,255,701,913	389	0.712%	12.170%	5.224%				
2008	\$ 4,926,613,334	150	0.668%	11.408%	39.405%				
2004	\$ 1,665,917,347	142	0.226%	3.858%	3.772%				
2003	\$ 1,330,366,451	179	0.180%	3.081%	18.481%				
2002	\$ 592,562,247	88	0.080%	1.372%	24.995%				
2001	\$ 441,241,854	63	0.060%	1.022%	19.931%				
1998	\$ 321,645,506	37	0.044%	0.745%	10.562%				
2000	\$ 277,360,468	36	0.038%	0.642%	22.469%				
Total	\$ 42,918,849,609	2,552	5.817%	99.385%					



## Delinquency by State





## State Delinquency



- The 10 largest states by delinquent unpaid balance reflect 59.3% of CMBS delinquency, while the 10 largest states by overall CMBS exposure reflect only 51.6% of the CMBS universe.
- The top three states ranked by delinquency exposure have remained fairly consistent, as New York, California, and Florida collectively accounted for 30.5% of delinquency through November 2013 (down from 30.2% a month prior)



# Trailing 12-Month Special Servicing Exposure



Trailing 12 Month Delinquency									
	All Specially Serviced		Loans Current But w/ Special Servicer				Delinquent & Specially Serviced		
Month	UPB	% of CMBS		UPB	% of CMBS		UPB	% of CMBS	
13-Oct \$	52.99	7.18%	\$	10.92	1.48%	\$	42.07	79.4%	
13-Sep \$	54.23	7.29%	\$	11.09	1.49%	\$	43.14	79.5%	
13-Aug \$	55.85	7.50%	\$	11.15	1.50%	\$	44.70	80.0%	
13-Jul \$	58.15	7.81%	\$	13.12	1.76%	\$	45.03	77.4%	
13-Jun \$	60.67	8.23%	\$	14.30	1.94%	\$	46.37	76.4%	
13-May \$	63.31	8.55%	\$	14.72	1.99%	\$	43.34	68.5%	
13-Apr \$	64.01	8.76%	\$	15.96	2.18%	\$	48.05	75.1%	
13-Mar \$	67.45	9.19%	\$	15.92	2.17%	\$	51.52	76.4%	
13-Feb \$	69.29	9.61%	\$	18.57	2.57%	\$	50.72	73.2%	
13-Jan \$	70.16	9.77%	\$	19.15	2.67%	\$	51.01	72.7%	
12-Dec \$	71.31	9.89%	\$	18.62	2.58%	\$	52.69	73.9%	
12-Nov \$	72.06	10.15%	\$	18.52	2.61%	\$	53.54	74.3%	
12-Oct \$	75.26	10.46%	\$	21.37	2.97%	\$	53.88	71.6%	

<sup>\*</sup>Figures in Billions




# Delinquency Rates: Property Type



#### Property Type Monthly Delinquency: as Percentage of CMBS Universe

(Source: Morningstar)






# Property Type Stratification Specially Serviced Assets



### Property Type Stratification - Specially Serviced Assets






# CMBS Delinquency Exposure by Vintage



### CMBS Delinquency Exposure by Vintage: As % of Outstanding Vintage Balance





## "A/B" Structure




#### **Debt Relief** | How CMBS servicers split bad loans to allow borrowers to keep their properties

A bank makes a commercial mortgage to a developer, then sells the loan as commercial-mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS. The cash flow generated by this property slowly repays investors in the CMBS deal.

If the cash flow declines, the loan becomes delinquent and the "special servicer," who represents CMBS investors, has to choose between modifying the loan terms and foreclosing on the property.

The servicer splits the loan into an 'A' note and a 'B' note. The property's cash flow is only enough to cover debt service on the 'A' note, while the 'B' note becomes a "hope" note and gets no payment for the loan's term. The hope is that upon maturity of the loan, if there are any proceeds left after the 'A' note is paid off, some of the remaining dollars would be used to pay down the 'B' note.





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